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T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     he use of maritime autonomous vehicles (MAVs) is increasing for a vari-
ety of ocean activities, which raises challenging questions about how these 
crafts fit within existing ocean governance. Most importantly, we need to 
consider the consequences for international law if we are to maintain a rules-
based order on the oceans. The significance of MAVs for international law 
has already become a focal point for the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) in relation to maritime safety.1 Likewise, numerous scholars have ex-
amined MAVs in relation to the law of armed conflict.2 
By contrast, the potential use (and abuse) of MAVs with regard to mari-
time security has not yet been greatly scrutinized.3 Accordingly, this article 
provides a preliminary assessment of how international law relating to mari-
time security can account for the operations of MAVs. As the use of MAVs 
increase, it is apparent that there will also be repercussions for the interna-
tional legal framework in place to promote maritime security. For example, 
in January 2019, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea announced their plans 
to use MAVs for activities such as surveillance, coastal border patrols, search 
and rescue, and mine detection.4 Such examples suggest that the difficult le-
gal questions that MAVs raise will become more significant as use increases. 
                                                                                                                      
1. See International Maritime Organization [IMO], Regulatory Scoping Exercise for the Use 
of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS): Work Conducted by the CMI International Working 
Group on Unmanned Ships, I.M.O. Doc. MSC 99/INF.8 (Feb. 13, 2018); Comité Maritime 
International, International Working Group Position Paper on Unmanned Ships and the International 
Regulatory Framework (Mar. 29, 2017), https://comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/05/CMI-Position-Paper-on-Unmanned-Ships.pdf. 
2. See, e.g., Rob McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea: USVs, UUVs and the Ade-
quacy of the Law, 21 JOURNAL OF LAW, INFORMATION AND SCIENCE 100, 103–08 (2011) 
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea; Michael N. Schmitt & David S. 
Goddard, International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems, 98 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 567 (2016); Erich D. Grome, Spectres of the Sea: The 
United States Navy’s Autonomous Ghost Fleet, its Capabilities and Impacts, and the Legal Ethical Issues 
that Surround, 49 JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COMMERCE 31 (2018); Robert McLaugh-
lin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles and the Law of Naval Warfare, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 229 (Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014). 
3. Within the existing literature, if addressed at all, the common approach is to raise 
questions without delving into possible answers. 
4. Tom Abke, Indo-Pacific Countries Turn to Unmanned Vessels to Patrol Region’s Waters, 
INDO-PACIFIC DEFENCE FORUM (Jan. 25, 2019), http://apdf-magazine.com/indo-pacific-
countries-turn-to-unmanned-vessels-to-patrol-regions-waters/. 
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The appeal of MAVs for maritime security purposes is clear. As Pedrozo 
has noted, “because they reduce risk to human life, unmanned systems are 
becoming the preferred alternative for dull, dirty or dangerous missions.”5 
Moreover, MAVs can stay at sea for longer periods than vessels with crews, 
may expand the areas of operation, and could potentially fill capacity gaps 
and reduce costs.6 All of these features may prove advantageous to States as 
they consider what additional tools can be used to enhance maritime security, 
especially in relation to maritime domain awareness or surveillance, as well 
as in relation to law enforcement efforts. Thus, there is an expectation that 
MAVs will be used in peacetime maritime security operations,7 but there is 
also room to consider how that use might be regulated under the existing 
legal architecture and where gaps or ambiguities might be revealed. 
The legal regime relevant to MAVs is the regime used by navies for 
peacetime operations. The application of this regime has led to discussions 
about the status of MAVs as warships and their possible immunities.8 Com-
mentators have already canvassed the rights of navigation that might apply 
in relation to MAVs, including whether they enjoy the right of innocent pas-
sage and what might constitute “normal mode” in the context of transit pas-
sage.9 These questions are pertinent to the deployment of MAVs for surveil-
lance and other information-gathering exercises. Some analysis of the use of 
MAVs for intelligence gathering was triggered by the Chinese Navy’s seizure 
of the MAV launched from the USNS Bowditch in the Philippines’ exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in 2016.10 However, our understanding of maritime 
                                                                                                                      
5. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Employment of Marine Unmanned Vehicles in the South China 
Sea 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Andrew Norris, Legal Issues 
Relating to Unmanned Maritime Systems Monograph 2 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731705. 
6. Norris, supra note 5, at 6; Craig H. Allen, Determining the Legal Status of Unmanned 
Maritime Vehicles: Formalism vs Functionalism, 49 JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COM-
MERCE 477, 487 (2018) (noting that MAVs may increase productivity and quality control, 
and ultimately perform some tasks better than humans). 
7. See James Kraska, The Law of Unmanned Naval Systems in War and Peace, 5 JOURNAL OF 
OCEAN TECHNOLOGY 44, 46 (2010) (stating that “the use of unmanned systems at sea is 
more likely to occur during routine naval activities, such as manoeuvres and exercises, or 
peacetime maritime security operations, such as counter-drug or shipping interdiction”). 
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea, supra note 2, at 108–11. 
9. See, e.g., Kraska, supra note 7, at 54–55; see also Comité Maritime International, supra 
note 1, at 5; Leonida Giunta, The Enigmatic Juridical Regime of Unmanned Maritime Systems, in 
OCEANS 2015 – GENOVA 692, 694–95 (2015). 
10. See, e.g., Christopher C. Swain, Towards Greater Certainty for Unmanned Navigation, a 
Recommended United States Military Perspective on Application of the “Rules of the Road” to Unmanned 
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security encompasses more than the peacetime operation of navies and ex-
tends to diverse law enforcement activities in response to crimes at sea.11 
MAVs may be relevant in relation to law enforcement in two contexts. 
First, States may wish to deploy MAVs to enhance their law enforcement 
capabilities, especially in the detection of illicit activity at sea. That is evident 
in the declared use of MAVs by Singapore, Japan, and South Korea men-
tioned above. Second, MAVs may be utilized by non-State actors to further 
their criminal activities. Remote-controlled vessels have already been used 
for terrorist purposes,12 and it may be readily envisioned that smugglers will 
use MAVs as cost-efficient tools for transporting illicit goods at sea.13 These 
different uses of MAVs prompt questions about the operation of interna-
tional law and the extent that existing and future technology is accommo-
dated within the international legal regime. 
To address, albeit not fully resolve, these questions, this article assesses 
the possible interpretation of international law that may be applicable in dif-
ferent scenarios involving the use of MAVs. Consistent with the rules of 
treaty interpretation, regard must be had to the ordinary meaning of any 
treaty provision in its context and in the light of its object and purpose.14 In 
this regard, it is important to recall the position of the International Court of 
Justice that any treaty must be “interpreted and applied within the framework 
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.”15 Thus, 
while we might be facing disruptive technology, commentators have argued 
that we are not facing disruptive international law.16 What seems apparent is 
                                                                                                                      
Maritime Systems, 3 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 119, 124–25 (2018); Mark 
J. Valencia, US-China Underwater Drone Incident: Legal Grey Areas, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 11, 
2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/us-china-underwater-drone-incident-legal-grey-
areas/. 
11. This understanding could potentially extend even further under some definitions of 
maritime security. See Christian Bueger & Timothy Edmunds, Beyond Sea Blindness: A New 
Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, 93 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1293 (2017). 
12. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
15. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 53 (June 21). 
16. The preference espoused in this regard is that general principles or foundational 
constructs of the law of the sea can be relied upon to accommodate the changing technol-
ogy. See, e.g., Kraska, supra note 7; McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea, supra note 2. 
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that shortcomings that exist in the international legal framework for mari-
time security are not obviated by the operation of MAVs, but rather the util-
ity of the technology continues to be hampered by the operation of the law. 
The article thus proceeds as follows. Part II briefly addresses the ques-
tion of terminology, and contemplates why yet another acronym must be 
considered in the discussion of autonomous craft at sea. Part III turns to the 
question of status, reflecting on the existing analyses undertaken on this 
point, highlighting how this discussion has implications for maritime secu-
rity. Parts IV, V, and VI consider different dimensions of law enforcement: 
hot pursuit, the right of visit, and specific law enforcement regimes. Part VII 
turns to surveillance and intelligence gathering, which are relevant for law 
enforcement, as well as the peacetime operations of navies. Part VIII con-
cludes, underlining how MAVs can largely be seen to sit within the existing 
legal framework, and perhaps more interestingly, whether the use of MAVs 
can improve the implementation of the existing rules rather than prompting 
a need for new ones. 
 
II. TERMINOLOGY 
 
There has been a range of terminology used when discussing MAVs, often 
depending on the degree of autonomy the vehicle has, whether it is used in 
combat, and whether it is below, on, or above the surface of the water. The 
literature has revealed the use of the following terms: 
 
UV  Unmanned Vehicle 
MUV Marine Unmanned Vehicle 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV Unmanned Underwater (or Undersea) Vehicle 
UCUV Unmanned Combat Underwater Vehicle 
UCSV Unmanned Combat Surface Vehicle 
UCV Unmanned Combat Vehicle 
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle 
MASS Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship 
UMV Unmanned Maritime Vehicle 
UMS Unmanned Maritime System 
 
By referencing “unmanned” vehicles, it is possible to elide the degrees 
of autonomy that exist in relation to vessels that do not have a crew on 
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board. Lloyd’s Register has developed a definition of autonomy for ships 
that includes six levels of autonomy ranging from decision support on board 
to a fully autonomous vessel.17 In the regulatory context, autonomy levels 
can be divided into four categories: “M: Manual navigation with automated 
processes and decision support,” “R: Remote-controlled vessel with crew on 
board,” “RU: Remote-controlled vessel without crew on board,” and “A: 
Autonomous vessel.”18 The level of control may become relevant in as-
sessing how regulations will operate in relation to MAVs in different con-
texts. In some instances, a “binary” distinction is drawn between autono-
mous and remotely-controlled vessels for regulatory compliance.19 Pritchett 
has commented that the dominant structure of surface MAVs is likely to be 
a hybrid of remotely operated and autonomous vessels.20 
The “unmanned” terminology may be useful to gloss over this distinc-
tion and encompass the varying degrees of autonomy. Certainly, the term is 
endemic throughout the literature and in Navy manuals.21 The IMO has in-
stead opted for the use of “autonomous” to encompass all levels of auton-
omy previously discussed and in its current work on the application of mar-
itime safety laws to autonomous surface ships.22 A similar approach to that 
of the IMO is taken here; this gendered term is not essential nor appropriate 
and it is not used in this article. Where necessary, the distinction will be made 
between “remote-controlled” and “fully autonomous” vessels. 
                                                                                                                      
17. International Maritime Organization [IMO], Final Report: Analysis of Regulatory Barri-
ers to the Use of Autonomous Ships, I.M.O. Doc. MSC 99/INF.3 (Jan. 18, 2018). 
18. Id. 
19. Comité Maritime International, supra note 1, at 1. 
20. Paul W. Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technology, 
40 TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL 197, 199 (2015). 
21. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 6, at 486 
The Navy master plans distinguish among three levels of UMV autonomy: (1) manual con-
trol (human in the loop continuously or near continuously); (2) semi-autonomous (some 
operations executed completely autonomously and some initiated or controlled by an oper-
ator); and (3) autonomous or fully autonomous (the vehicle governs and makes its own 
decisions throughout). 
22. See International Maritime Organization [IMO], Regulatory Scoping Exercise for the Use 
of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS): Initial Review of IMO Instruments Under the Purview 
of MSC (Note by the Secretariat), I.M.O. Doc. MSC 100/INF.3 (Aug. 9, 2018). This approach 
aligns with industry practice as well, which uses “autonomous” to denote an absence of 
humans on board. See Kara Chadwick, Unmanned Maritime Systems Will Shape the Future of 
Naval Operations: Is International Law Ready?, in MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: HELP OR HINDRANCE? (Malcolm Evans & Sofia Galani eds., forthcoming 2019). 
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Significant discussion has also emerged around the word “vessel” or 
“ship,”23 particularly given the varied definitions of ships that are found in 
different international instruments.24 This may explain why the word “vehi-
cle” has been preferred in the terminology. Most commonly, the definitions 
provided for ships and vessels do not address any issue as to whether there 
is a crew on board the ship or not.25 The distinction has been relevant in the 
context of floats and gliders, which are autonomous vehicles or devices used 
for data collection. Some commentators have taken the view that small ob-
jects that float with currents with the sole purpose of collecting data and that 
are not subject to any navigation regime should be considered “equipment” 
under the regime for marine scientific research rather than as ships.26 Yet the 
autonomous nature and operation of floats and gliders prompt questions as 
to the proper application of the marine scientific regime under the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).27 
It is interesting to compare the maritime setting with aviation. In the 
latter context, every form of flying vehicle may be considered an “aircraft” 
for the purposes of regulation. The result of this approach in the United 
States is that aircraft ranging from recreational drones to commercial airlin-
ers fall within the regulatory authority of the Federal Aviation Authority.28 
In the military context, no distinction is usually drawn between aircraft with 
pilots and crew onboard and those without.29 It begs the question as to 
whether we need to continue this discussion in the maritime context. If not, 
                                                                                                                      
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The terms “ship” and “vessel” are used throughout UNCLOS, 
seemingly with the same meaning. See OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, UNITED NATIONS, NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
PART VII, SECTION I (ARTICLES 87, 89, 90–94, 96–98) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 80 (1989). 
24. See Allen, supra note 6 (discussing varying definitions of ships in different interna-
tional legal instruments). 
25. Comité Maritime International, supra note 1, at 3. 
26. See, e.g., Katharina Bork, Johannes Karstensen, Martin Visbeck & Andreas Zimmer-
mann, The Legal Regulation of Floats and Gliders – In Quest of a New Regime?, 39 OCEAN DEVEL-
OPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 298, 308–09 (2008); Tobias Hofmann & Alexander 
Proelss, The Operation of Gliders Under the International Law of the Sea, 46 OCEAN DEVELOP-
MENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 177–78 (2015). 
27. See Bork, Karstensen, Visbeck & Zimmermann, supra note 26, at 310–12. 
28. Press Release, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal vs. Local Drone Authority 
(July 20, 2018), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=229 
38. 
29. See Kraska, supra note 7, at 61–62. 
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the regulatory framework could have a functional focus.30 One consequence 
of treating all aircraft as such is that the rules relevant to aerial MAVs should 
be largely understood as aligned with the rules relevant to overflight and in-
ternational aviation law. In the maritime context, the overflight of aerial 
MAVs will still be relevant in assessing the legality of passage over a coastal 
State’s territorial sea or over an international strait subject to the transit pas-
sage regime. 
At present, whether a surface MAV is a ship or a vessel may well be a 
threshold question to determine which legal regime is applicable for the reg-
ulation of its actions under international law.31 For the purposes of this arti-
cle, this issue will be most pertinent in relation to intelligence gathering and 
surveillance and is discussed in Part VII below. It must be anticipated that 
the variety of MAVs means that a definitive answer on whether one is a ship 
or not is elusive. It may be a question of interpretation in each instance and 
will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis considering the characteris-
tics and the activities in which the MAV is involved, as well as the objects 
and purposes of the treaty at issue.32 
 
III. LEGAL STATUS OF MAVS 
 
The general expectation appears to be that rules relating to surface vessels, 
submarines, and aircraft apply regardless of whether there are humans on 
board or not. As with other issues under the law of the sea, when a challenge 
to the legality of certain actions arises, the preliminary questions remain: 
where is it happening and what is happening? It is in the latter setting that 
we start asking whether a MAV is a ship or a vessel in relation to the activities 
being undertaken. Who is on board may become relevant once we start ar-
ticulating the rights and duties that adhere to different actors depending on 
where something is happening and what is happening. 
                                                                                                                      
30. See Hofmann & Proelss, supra note 26, at 175. Hofmann & Proelss note that in the 
instances where ship or vessel are defined, the definitions “are characterized by their pur-
posive nature.” Id. 
31. Allen, supra note 6, at 480. 
32. See id. Allen also supports a specific examination for the particular MAV, arguing 
“[g]iven the diversity in UMV designs and operating modes, a single characterization that 
would apply to the entire class of unmanned surface and undersea vehicles, both existing 
and those yet to be developed, is at best premature and almost certainly unwise.” Id. at 493. 
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In discussions on the application of the law of armed conflict to MAVs, 
commentators have observed that MAVs will potentially fit within the defi-
nition of warships under Article 29 of UNCLOS,33 especially where there is 
some remote control rather than fully autonomous operation. This interpre-
tation fits with the MAV being “under the command of an officer” and/or 
potentially “manned by a crew.” Moreover, a MAV launched from a warship 
could be viewed as a system of that ship rather than having an independent 
status.34 Even if there is disagreement around these points, MAVs that are 
government-owned and used for non-commercial purposes will largely enjoy 
sovereign immunity comparable to warships.35 
One difference that may emerge in a peacetime context concerns the 
right of innocent passage. Under Article 30, a coastal State may require a 
warship to leave immediately if it does not comply with the coastal State’s 
laws and regulations,36 whereas under Article 25(1), a coastal State “may take 
the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not inno-
cent.”37 Although this distinction suggests more action might be taken 
against vessels that are not classed as warships, coastal State “steps” would 
                                                                                                                      
33. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 29 
For the purposes of this Convention, ‘warship’ means a ship belonging to the armed forces 
of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the 
command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is 
under regular armed forces discipline. 
This definition is well established under international law, drawing from the 1907 
Hague Convention No. VII. Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-ships 
arts. 2–6, Oct 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319. 
34. McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea, supra note 2, at 109. 
35. This immunity is set out in Article 32 of UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 
32. Such immunity has also been claimed in manuals of the German Navy and the U.S. 
Navy. See GERMAN NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK: LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERA-
TIONS OF NAVAL FORCES § 2.1.1 (2002); U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.3.6 (2017); see also McLaughlin, Un-
manned Naval Vehicles at Sea, supra note 2, at 110. 
36. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 30. 
37. Id. The status of a MAV as a warship is also an issue in the law of armed conflict in 
relation to the exercise of belligerent rights. Only warships have those rights, including the 
right to conduct offensive attacks. See Pedrozo, supra note 5, at 7 (“Naval auxiliaries, mer-
chant vessels, and presumably [MAV] crafts may only defend themselves from enemy at-
tacks—they may not conduct attacks in offensive combat operations in an international 
armed conflict.”). 
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still need to account for the sovereign immunities enjoyed by MAVs that are 
government vessels operated for non-commercial purposes. 
Ultimately, as noted in relation to terminology, the legal status of MAVs 
will depend on a contextual analysis when considering the ordinary meaning 
of references to ships, vessels, or warships. In relation to the use of MAVs 
in law enforcement and the applicability of international law to their opera-
tions, Norris has correctly observed that “it is important to distinguish the 
vessel-like components for these maritime functions from the crew-like 
components.”38 The following parts address different law enforcement ac-
tivities and consider the implications for existing international legal frame-
works if a MAV is engaged either by a State to facilitate law enforcement or 
by a non-State actor to enhance criminal activity. 
 
IV. RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT 
 
The right of hot pursuit has been codified in Article 111 of UNCLOS.39 This 
right provides a basis for warships, military aircraft, “or other ships or aircraft 
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and author-
ized to that effect” to exercise enforcement jurisdiction over a “foreign ship” 
that is fleeing or has fled from maritime zones under the sovereignty or ju-
risdiction of the coastal State.40 The right of hot pursuit is an exception to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State over its vessels on the high seas.41 
Such jurisdiction may be exercised where there is good reason to believe that 
a foreign ship has violated the laws and regulations of the pursuing State.42 
The pursuit of that ship must commence “when the foreign ship or one of 
its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial 
sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued 
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been 
interrupted.”43 
From this, it is apparent that a MAV could be used for initial surveillance 
to detect vessels that may be undertaking illicit activities in the relevant mar-
                                                                                                                      
38. Norris, supra note 5, at 47. 
39. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 111. 
40. See id. arts. 111(5), 111(1). 
41. See generally NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 109–
14 (2011). 
42. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 111(1). 
43. Id. 
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itime zones of the coastal State. The MAV could have the capability, espe-
cially if remote-controlled, to send an order to the offending vessel to stop. 
UNCLOS anticipates that pursuit only begins after “a visual or auditory sig-
nal to stop . . . at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the 
foreign ship.”44 This signal requirement has been understood to incorporate 
subsequent technological developments whereby the signal may be given via 
radio broadcast.45 MAVs could also meet this requirement through other 
more modern means. Indeed, the technology on board the MAV may allow 
for a suitable communication with the foreign ship. Alternatively, if remotely 
controlled, the MAV could deliver a signal given from its home base. 
After a signal to stop, a MAV could pursue the vessel continuously until 
it stops and allows possible boarding. At this point, a crew is needed to board 
and inspect the vessel (until robots or perhaps even smaller remote-con-
trolled drones have that capability).46 Otherwise, the MAV pursues the sus-
pect ship until a boarding party on another vessel arrives. 
UNCLOS anticipates that another vessel may take over the boarding 
phase when there is an aircraft that has undertaken the pursuit,47 so on this 
basis it could be argued that there would be no legal barrier to a crewed 
vessel taking over the pursuit or visit function.48 States have already under-
taken and further anticipate that multilateral hot pursuits might occur 
whereby the pursuing vessel is replaced by another in the course of the pur-
suit.49 The jurisdictional challenges that might emerge where the pursuing 
ships are from different States would not arise where the MAV is from the 
same State as the ship that ultimately undertakes the boarding.50 Given the 
                                                                                                                      
44. Id. art. 111(4). 
45. See Rachel Baird, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, 
Economic and Historical Factors Relevant to its Development and Persistence, 5 MELBOURNE JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299, 328 (2004); KLEIN, supra note 41, at 110. 
46. This dimension of MAVs and boarding is discussed further in the next Part con-
cerning the right of visit. See infra notes 54–64 and accompanying text. 
47. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 111(6). 
48. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Article 111, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 778 (Alexander Proelss ed., 2017); see also Craig H. Allen, The 
Doctrine of Hot Pursuit: A Functional Interpretation Adaptable to Emerging Maritime Law Enforcement, 
20 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 320 (1989). 
49. See Warwick Gullett & Clive Schofield, Pushing the Limits of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: Australian and French Cooperative Surveillance and Enforcement in the South Ocean, 22 INTER-
NATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARITIME AND COASTAL LAW 545 (2007). 
50. See generally Erik J. Molenaar, Multilateral Hot Pursuit and Illegal Fishing in the Southern 
Ocean: The Pursuits of the Viarsa 1 and the South Tomi, 19 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MA-
RINE AND COASTAL LAW 19 (2004). 
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increasing reliance on MAVs for surveillance, it could well be foreseen that 
they will be used for this particular enforcement activity. Indeed, MAVs may 
be better equipped to do so when it is recalled that some hot pursuits have 
lasted over days and caused difficulties for crew and supplies in these cir-
cumstances.51 
The alternative scenario to consider would be where the foreign ship is 
a MAV and there are reasons to believe that the operation of the MAV vio-
lates the laws and regulations of a pursuing State. Given that there is a refer-
ence to a foreign ship being subject to the right of hot pursuit, it may be 
necessary to re-engage on the debate of whether any particular MAV is a 
ship or not. Does the right of hot pursuit not emerge if there is no “ship” to 
pursue? This outcome may seem unlikely when it is recalled that UNCLOS 
already anticipates the setting where there is a so-called “mother ship” that 
has “boats or other craft working as a team.”52 However, Article 111(4) pro-
jects a scenario where the mother ship may be pursued rather than the boats 
or other craft; the mother ship having constructive presence within the rele-
vant maritime zones of the coastal State. Factually, the mother ship that op-
erates the MAV may be the more desirable objective for law enforcement 
purposes than the MAV. 
Yet, there appears to be a gap in the text of UNCLOS in relation to the 
permissible pursuit of “other craft.” It may be argued that it is implicit that 
boats or other craft working as a team are also subject to enforcement pow-
ers arising from hot pursuit. This interpretation could be reinforced by con-
sidering whether other craft may be validly arrested or seized on the high 
seas. If the MAV is not State-owned, but constitutes another craft that is 
engaged in illicit activity and not registered to a State, it does not enjoy the 
protection of a flag State. Then, if there is not a crew on board that may be 
protected by their individual States of nationality, the MAV seemingly could 
be seized by State authorities on the high seas regardless of any hot pursuit.53 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
51. The twenty-one day pursuit of the Viarsa 1 ultimately involved enforcement au-
thorities from Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. See Guilfoyle, supra note 
48, ¶ 11. 
52. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 111(4). 
53. The scenario that might then emerge is whether there would be a domestic court 
action for private individuals to recover property seized by the government. Such action 
would presumably only be undertaken if the MAV was not engaged in unlawful activity. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2019 
256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. RIGHT OF VISIT 
 
Under UNCLOS, Article 110 allows for “a warship which encounters on the 
high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in 
accordance with articles 95 and 96” to board that foreign ship if there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the ship is engaged in piracy, the maritime 
slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting.54 Likewise, boarding is permissible 
if the ship is without nationality or “though flying a foreign flag or refusing 
to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the war-
ship.”55 The right of visit may also be performed by “any other duly author-
ized ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government 
service.”56 Hence, as an initial matter, a MAV does not need to meet the 
criteria of being a warship to exercise a right of visit. 
As indicated in Article 110, and as discussed in the academic literature,57 
the right of visit comprises different stages. First, a warship “may proceed to 
verify the ship’s right to fly its flag.”58 To verify the ship’s flag, UNCLOS 
anticipates that “a boat under the command of an officer” will be sent to the 
suspected ship. However, sending a boat with an officer on board is not 
required under UNCLOS, but is only one option that could be pursued to 
verify a ship’s right to fly its flag.59 
Even if not legally required, the possible availability and use of MAVs 
may prompt the question of whether a physical inspection is necessary for 
the purposes of verifying a flag. Would it be possible for cameras to note the 
ship’s markings, to send the images to a home base where authorities there 
could contact the relevant flag-State authorities to confirm the nationality or 
registration of the vessel? Or even automatically contact State authorities 
based on the IMO number of the vessel or its identifying marks? It may be 
the case that suspicions are resolved through this preliminary intervention 
by the MAV without the need for further engagement by the authorities 
from the visiting State. However, the external indications, or the amount of 
time involved in dealing with flag authorities, may mean that the inspection 
                                                                                                                      
54. And the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article 109. UN-
CLOS, supra note 23, art. 109. 
55. Id. art. 110(1). 
56. Id. art. 110(5). 
57. See, e.g., Douglas Guilfoyle, Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12 
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 1, 4 (2007). 
58. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 110(2). 
59. Id. (“To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the sus-
pected ship.”). 
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of the physical registration papers of the vessel is needed. At this point, this 
process can only be undertaken if persons board the suspect vessel and con-
duct the necessary visual inspection.60 
In the next stage of the right of visit, UNCLOS provides: “If suspicion 
remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further 
examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible 
consideration.”61 The assumption in this provision is that the inspection can 
only be done through physical inspection. Perhaps a future can be imagined 
where an aerial drone will collect information about the vessel that is suffi-
cient for identifying that an offense has been committed. Yet inspection 
within the vessel may be needed and such access would more likely be ac-
corded to a visiting party, rather than a visiting MAV. The engagement of 
relevant officials would be important at this point in the event that an offense 
has been committed and it is necessary to collect evidence of any crime for 
future prosecution. At present, it is apparent that MAVs are only relevant 
for the first stage of the right of visit. 
What if the suspect ship is a MAV? We again would need to determine 
if the MAV is a “ship” that is flagged to a State and, if so, that State’s consent 
must be sought for any possible boarding. It falls within the exclusive juris-
diction of each State to determine the conditions for registration of a vessel, 
as international law only requires that there is a genuine link between the 
vessel and the State in question.62 If a MAV is registered to a State, then it 
would need to bear the markings or fly the flag of that State. Yet, how to 
proceed with a boarding remains problematic. Allen has observed the diffi-
culty of “how to conduct a boarding when there is no master or crew to 
answer questions regarding the craft’s nationality, to maneuver the craft to 
accommodate the boarding, or to present the necessary documents once the 
boarding team is on board.”63 Without any markings or a flag, a MAV might 
be considered as stateless and treated as such under Article 110 of UNCLOS, 
hence obviating any flag-State authority in relation to the MAV.64 However, 
                                                                                                                      
60. It could be anticipated that the papers physically held on ships could be switched 
to a digitized form and so potentially accessed remotely. For a discussion on this point, see 
Eric Van Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Exploration, 20 JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 403, 415 (2014). 
61. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 110(2). 
62. See id. art. 91(1). 
63. Allen, supra note 6, at 491. 
64. See UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 110. 
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the same practical difficulties of boarding the MAV and checking registration 
papers again emerge. 
 
VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT REGIMES: MAVS IN CONTEXT 
 
The right of visit may be granted in bilateral or multilateral treaties that ad-
dress different maritime crimes. In some respects, the core issues that were 
highlighted in relation to the right of visit will be replayed in these other 
regimes, especially in relation to expectations around a physical boarding and 
inspection of a suspect ship. Accordingly, this Part considers some of the 
distinct features of various boarding regimes that may be implicated through 
the use of MAVs, again either by State authorities or by non-State actors 
(criminals). It does so by considering three examples: drug trafficking, ter-
rorism, and migrant smuggling.65 The latter example also considers the cor-
responding issue of search and rescue. 
 
A. Drug Trafficking 
 
Kraska described the “first ever drug bust” by a MAV in 2010 as follows: 
 
Launched from the frigate, which was on patrol in the Eastern Pacific, the 
[Fire Scout] UAV was engaged in a routine test flight. The Fire Scout’s 
radar acquired a suspected narcotics go-fast boat making its way north-
ward. The UAV tracked the go-fast for hours, and a law enforcement 
boarding team from the frigate interdicted the small vessel after it rendez-
voused with a mother ship. Sixty kilograms of cocaine were seized.66 
 
What is unknown from this account is the location of the go-fast boat when 
the MAV started tracking it and where the interdiction finally occurred. What 
is most relevant for present purposes, however, is the use to which the MAV 
was put in detecting the go-fast boat, tracking it, and feeding back location 
data to law enforcement officials. The MAV thus performed a critical law 
enforcement role in this example. 
                                                                                                                      
65. For a discussion of MAVs in relation to the UNCLOS provisions on piracy, see 
Anna Petrig, The Commission of Maritime Crimes with Unmanned Systems: An Interpretive Challenge 
for UNCLOS, in MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: HELP OR HINDRANCE?, 
supra note 22. 
66. Kraska, supra note 7, at 49. 
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UNCLOS establishes an obligation on all State parties to cooperate in 
the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances on the high seas.67 This cooperation for law enforcement purposes 
was elaborated on in the 1988 Drugs Convention.68 Article 17 of that treaty 
sets out requirements in relation to conducting the right of visit where it is 
suspected that a vessel is engaged in illicit trafficking of drugs. In addition to 
cooperating, parties are to “render such assistance within the means available 
to them.”69 If a State party has a MAV in the vicinity it could therefore fulfill 
its obligation to assist by deploying the MAV to monitor the suspect ship or, 
if possible, to gather further information about the ship. A State would likely 
still be meeting its obligations under Article 17 even if the MAV could not 
proceed to a visit of the suspect vessel since the assistance is limited to the 
“means available.” 
As with the right of visit, a MAV may be remotely controlled and/or 
otherwise have the capacity to notify the flag State and request confirmation 
of registry in relation to a suspect vessel in accordance with Article 17. A 
MAV undertaking these responsibilities must still be one that is “clearly 
marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to 
that effect.”70 It could further be anticipated that the operation of the MAV 
should meet safeguards associated with the right of visit, which, under the 
Drugs Convention, include “tak[ing] due account of the need not to endan-
ger the safety of life at sea, the security of the vessel and the cargo or to 
prejudice the commercial and legal interests of the flag State or any other 
interested State.”71 Moreover, any MAV would need to ensure its actions in 
suppressing illicit drug trafficking “take due account of the need not to in-
terfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdic-
tion of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea.”72 
The current limitations to the use of MAVs for these law enforcement pur-
poses again relate to the inability to board or search another vessel and un-
dertake an arrest or seizure of evidence as may be needed for the purposes 
of prosecution.73 
                                                                                                                      
67. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 108. 
68. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Drugs Convention]. 
69. Id. art. 17(2). 
70. Id. art. 17(10). 
71. Id. art. 17(5). 
72. Id. art. 17(11). 
73. As anticipated under the Drugs Convention. See id. art. 17(4). 
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It must also be anticipated that MAVs will be used by criminal organiza-
tions for smuggling purposes. Given that semi-submersible vessels with 
crews are already being used for this purpose, it would seem a natural pro-
gression to deploy underwater MAVs for similar purposes.74 If the MAV in 
question is a ship, it would need to be determined if it is registered to a State 
that has exclusive jurisdiction over that MAV. If so, the boarding could only 
proceed consistent with Article 17 of the 1988 Drugs Convention. If the 
MAV is a vessel without nationality, the Drugs Convention does not explic-
itly provide for a right of visit, although all parties must render assistance in 
suppressing the vessel’s use for illicit drug trafficking. 
Yet in the context of drug trafficking, a question may again emerge as to 
whether the MAV is a “ship” or not. It may be argued that a MAV used for 
the smuggling of any goods will always be considered a ship because it is 
engaged in transportation.75 Or, could the crafts be small enough and of such 
rudimentary design that they resemble “boats” or “objects” or “devices”? 
The result of the latter would be that a State seeking to prevent the move-
ment of a MAV laden with drugs could seize the MAV on the high seas 
claiming it is not a vessel and so does not receive any possible protections or 
assumptions that arise in the treatment of stateless vessels. If the ownership 
of the “object” is unknown and cannot be ascertained through any markings 
seemingly no violation of the freedoms of the high seas would occur. 
 
B. Terrorism 
 
The use of drones on land, particularly in the context of targeted attacks on 
terrorist leadership locations, has already prompted questions regarding their 
use as a weapon under the law of armed conflict,76 and similar considerations 
would emerge for the use of MAVs for the same purpose. Yet additional 
factors would also need to be considered in relation to the location at sea 
and possibly the relevant laws of naval warfare. For current purposes, I will 
address terrorism within the context of a law enforcement operation and put 
aside other questions that could validly emerge under the law of armed con-
flict, including whether that legal regime is applicable or not. 
                                                                                                                      
74. See Allen, supra note 6, at 478 n.1. 
75. For a discussion on the relevance of the “transportation” criterion, see Swain, supra 
note 10, at 130–34. 
76. See, e.g., Kraska, supra note 7, at 47; see generally Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo, Use of Un-
manned Systems to Combat Terrorism, 87 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 217 (2015). 
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The key multilateral treaty relating to maritime terrorism is the 2005 Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention, which comprises the 1988 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mar-
itime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol.77 The latter instrument extended the 
list of offenses to be criminalized in national legislation and enhanced the 
enforcement regime for the suppression of these acts.78 As an initial matter, 
it can be noted that warships or “ship[s] owned or operated by a State when 
being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or for policy purposes” are 
outside the scope of the Convention.79 Moreover, the immunities enjoyed by 
MAVs when government-owned and operated for non-commercial pur-
poses are preserved under the SUA Convention.80 
However, what if a non-State actor uses a MAV to commit a crime? For 
example, a MAV could be used for a terrorist attack against subsea infra-
structures, including oil and natural gas pipelines or telecommunication ca-
bles, or for the shipment of illicit cargo across national boundaries. On Jan-
uary 30, 2017, Houthi militants used a remote-controlled boat full of explo-
sives to attack a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea.81 Before this attack, Saudi forces 
intercepted another remote-controlled boat carrying explosives attempting 
to target an oil depot and distribution station in Yemen.82 More recently, on 
September 8, 2018, a remote-controlled boat with explosives onboard was 
found near an island on the western coast of Yemen.83 As these examples 
demonstrate, the use of MAVs in important shipping lanes poses a signifi-
cant threat to the freedom of navigation and commercial shipping interests. 
                                                                                                                      
77. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; International Maritime Organiza-
tion [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter 
SUA Convention]. 
78. For discussion of this treaty, see KLEIN, supra note 41, at 170–84; DOUGLAS GUIL-
FOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 254–59 (2009); JAMES 
KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 820–53 (2013). 
79. SUA Convention, supra note 77, art. 2(1). 
80. Id. art. 2(2). 
81. Christopher P. Cavas, New Houthi Weapon Emerges: A Drone Boat, DEFENSENEWS 
(Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/idex/2017/02/19/ 
new-houthi-weapon-emerges-a-drone-boat/. 
82. Marco Olimpio, Remote Controlled Terror: Houthi Suicide Boats, EUROPEAN EYE ON 
RADICALIZATION (Sept. 27, 2018), https://eeradicalization.com/remote-controlled-terror-
houthi-suicide-boats/. 
83. Id. 
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The MAVs used in these examples would constitute “ships” as defined 
in the SUA Convention to cover all vessels “of any type whatsoever not 
permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically supported craft, 
submersibles or other floating craft.”84 This definition of ships would likely 
encompass all varieties of MAVs. 
A review of the offenses listed in Article 3 reveals that the use of MAVs 
in these contexts would readily fall within the scope of the SUA Convention. 
For example, Houthi militants reportedly seized a MAV belonging to the 
U.S. Navy off the coast of Yemen in 2018.85 This act would fall within Article 
3(1)(a) as it involves the seizure of a ship (interpreted broadly as noted pre-
viously) by force.86 The person who remotely controls a MAV to explode 
when attacking another ship would also commit an offense under the con-
vention.87 Indeed, under the SUA Convention, using “a ship in a manner that 
causes death or serious injury or damage” when the person intends “to in-
timidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organ-
ization to do or to abstain from doing any act” is an offense.88 This certainly 
applies to Houthi militants using explosive-laden MAVs to target coastal in-
frastructure. Moreover, even the transportation of explosives by MAVs that 
are intended to be used “for the purpose of intimidating a population, or 
compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act” constitutes an offense under the convention.89 
From a cybersecurity perspective, questions have been raised about 
criminal elements taking control of the electronics of a MAV. While this 
question emerges in the context of vessels with crews as well, in that situa-
tion, presumably human intervention would be available to restore control 
or correct changes that are made to the ship’s operation. Does this constitute 
an act of terrorism, or perhaps even piracy?90 The SUA Convention may well 
remain applicable if the intention in taking control of the MAV is to cause 
death, serious injury, or damage.91 
The international legal framework for the suppression of offenses in-
volving MAVs is solid inasmuch as the definition of “ship” is inclusive of 
                                                                                                                      
84. SUA Convention, supra note 77, art. 1. 
85. See Swain, supra note 10, at 120. 
86. SUA Convention, supra note 77, art. 3(1). 
87. Id. art. 3(1)(c)–(e). 
88. Id. art. 3 bis (1)(a)(iii). 
89. Id. art. 3 bis (1)(b)(i). 
90. The latter is discussed in Pritchett, supra note 20, at 212–15. 
91. SUA Convention, supra note 77, art. 3(1)(a). 
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MAVs and the variety of offenses envisaged encompasses the different ways 
that MAVs could potentially be used to advance terrorist goals. The chal-
lenge in this setting is more that the number of States party to the 2005 SUA 
Convention is low, standing at forty-eight as of time of writing.92 Moreover, 
even once a State becomes party; it must ensure proper domestic implemen-
tation of the necessary legislation to criminalize the listed offenses to allow 
for prosecution or assistance to another State party seeking prosecution. 
 
C. Migrant Smuggling and Search and Rescue 
 
Law enforcement efforts against migrant smuggling and human trafficking 
frequently interface with search and rescue obligations given the condition 
of the vessels by which irregular migrants seek to move (or are moved) from 
one location to another. While it is important to understand the interaction 
between the different legal regimes for overall adherence to international ob-
ligations in these settings,93 for the purposes of understanding the role of 
MAVs in relation to migrant smuggling and search and rescue the two re-
gimes are considered separately in this section. 
For law enforcement efforts against migrant smuggling, States will rely 
on the authority they exercise as coastal States over their territorial seas and 
contiguous zones to prevent illegal migration. Beyond the contiguous zone, 
the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol provides for a right of visit under Ar-
ticle 8.94 Similar considerations arise as discussed above in terms of a MAV 
identification of a suspect vessel, and potentially undertaking an initial con-
firmation of registry, but being unable to complete a physical boarding to 
inspect documents, secure evidence, arrest the smugglers, or address the 
needs of the migrants on board consistent with flag-State consent. 
                                                                                                                      
92. Status of Treaties, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo 
.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/StatusOfTreaties.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
93. See, e.g., Natalie Klein, A Case for Harmonizing Laws on Maritime Interceptions of Irregular 
Migrants, 63 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 787 (2014); Violeta 
Moreno-Lax, Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member 
States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea, 23 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 174 
(2011); Daniel Ghezelbash, Violeta Moreno-Lax, Natalie Klein & Brian Opeskin, Securitiza-
tion of Search and Rescue at Sea: The Response to Boat Migration in the Mediterranean and Offshore 
Australia, 67 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 315 (2018). 
94. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 8, Nov. 15, 
2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507. 
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Using MAVs for surveillance purposes may assist State parties to the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol to meet obligations to exchange information 
about routes of smugglers and means of transportation.95 Interestingly, there 
is an obligation to exchange information, albeit subject to domestic law con-
straints, concerning “[s]cientific and technological information useful to law 
enforcement, so as to enhance each other’s ability to prevent, detect and 
investigate . . . conduct . . . and to prosecute those involved.”96 The caveat 
on this obligation is no doubt significant in the context of sharing commer-
cial or military information about available MAVs, but a State party may well 
seek information about MAVs or the surveillance data collected under Arti-
cle 10 from another State party if the MAVs are perceived as enhancing pos-
itive law enforcement outcomes against migrant smuggling.97 
If smugglers were using MAVs to transport irregular migrants, these ve-
hicles would presumably be of a size and functionality to constitute a “ves-
sel” or “ship.” Under Article 8(7) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, a MAV 
suspected of migrant smuggling could be “assimilated to a vessel without 
nationality” and subjected to boarding and search by State authorities con-
sistent with the existing legal regime.98 The difficulty for law enforcement 
officials would be operational in terms of their likely ability to board a vessel 
that is remotely controlled or autonomously programmed and cannot be 
readily incapacitated for boarding purposes. 
The core search and rescue obligation, as enshrined in UNCLOS, the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), 
and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (Search 
and Rescue Convention), is that assistance must be rendered to persons in 
distress or in danger of being lost at sea.99 Under UNCLOS and the SOLAS 
                                                                                                                      
95. See id. arts. 10(1)(a), 10(1)(d). 
96. Id. art. 10(1)(f). 
97. This obligation could be coupled with requirements relating to training and tech-
nical cooperation that are set out in the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol. See id. art. 14. 
98. Id. art. 8(7). 
99. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 98(1); International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea annex, ch. 5 reg. 10(a), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
SOLAS Convention]; International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue annex, ¶ 
1.3, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter SAR Convention]. The SOLAS Conven-
tion may not be applicable to all MAVs since the treaty exempts cargo ships below certain 
tonnages, as well as excluding warships. Further, the SOLAS Convention only applies to 
ships engaged in international voyages. 
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Convention, this obligation rests with the master of the vessel.100 Obviously 
on a MAV there is no master on the actual vessel, which might well raise the 
question as to whether (or to whom) the duty to rescue could still adhere.101 
Where the MAV is remotely controlled, the duty could be deemed to rest 
with the operator as the functional equivalent to the master.102 The operator 
may be in a position to communicate the location and need of a vessel in 
distress to the relevant rescue coordination center. This possibility would 
seemingly not exist with a fully autonomous vessel, although Pritchett has 
observed, “one could certainly make a compelling argument that the person 
who programmed the control system, the owner or charterer of the USV 
[Unmanned Surface Vehicle], or the vessel itself was ‘in charge’ and was thus 
the master who had an obligation to rescue.”103 
Even where the duty to rescue is understood as existing more broadly, 
rather than falling solely within the responsibilities of the master,104 practical 
issues may emerge in terms of the capabilities of a MAV to take rescued 
individuals on board and provide the food, water, and/or medical supplies 
necessary for the situation. While it could be suggested that it is incumbent 
on the designers of MAVs to account for this obligation and design the ves-
sels accordingly, the subjective elements of the duty must also be recalled. In 
particular, the obligation to render assistance is qualified in various ways: “in 
so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship” and “in so far as 
such action can be reasonably expected of him.”105 While international law 
may provide sufficiently flexible parameters as to how the duty to rescue is 
met in the context of MAVs, the issue is more likely to be explored in do-
mestic litigation if claims of negligence or other tortious conduct are alleged 
against a ship owner, charterer, or MAV designer, or MAV builder.106 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
100. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 98(1); SOLAS Convention, supra note 99, annex, ch. 
5 reg. 10(a). 
101. See Pritchett, supra note 20, at 208. 
102. See discussion in id. at 208–09. 
103. Id. at 209. 
104. As is anticipated under the SAR Convention. See SAR Convention, supra note 99, 
annex, ¶ 2.1.10. 
105. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 98; see also Comité Maritime International, supra note 
1, at 6. 
106. See Pritchett, supra note 20. 
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VII. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING TO SUPPORT MARITIME SECURITY 
 
Intelligence gathering and surveillance are key missions associated with 
MAVs, whether as part of defense planning or for law enforcement or envi-
ronmental monitoring. For example, in listing the primary application of dif-
ferent types of MAVs, the U.S. Navy emphasized intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance.107 The United States has deployed MAVs in diverse con-
texts, including as part of a remote mine-hunting system whereby an under-
water MAV was used for identification of mines in Khawr Abd Allah chan-
nel in Iraq.108 MAVs may therefore be relevant for core defense concerns, 
such as force protection, electronic warfare, anti-surface warfare, or for con-
temporary maritime security issues, such as counterterrorism or search and 
rescue.109 McLaughlin has noted that the use of MAVs for surveillance may 
be advantageous from a political or strategic perspective as the stakes are 
much lower if a MAV is seized or sunk than if a submarine or warship is 
sunk with a large loss of life.110 The demand of a national population for a 
response may be less if only an asset is lost rather than an asset, as well as 
the individuals on board, so the likelihood of escalation is reduced.111 How-
ever, these dynamics may also serve to embolden States seeking to disrupt 
the operations of MAVs in their maritime zones.112 
The type of MAV and where it is operating will determine to what regu-
lation it is subject. Some distinction may be needed between different types 
of MAVs that gather data and other information, as floats and gliders have 
been considered as separate from ships. Floats have been defined as “[a]n 
autonomous vehicle used for collection of . . . data . . . and floating passively 
                                                                                                                      
107. See Tuneer Mukherjee, Securing the Maritime Commons: The Role of Artificial Intelligence 
in Naval Operations 6, 11 (Observer Research Foundation (ORF), ORF Occasional Paper 
No. 159, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/research/42497-a-i-in-naval-operations-ex-
ploring-possibilities-debating-ethics/; see also Norris, supra note 5, at 9 (referring to the UUV 
Master Plan, which identifies intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as the first pri-
ority mission for these MAVs). 
108. Kraska, supra note 7, at 46; see also Andrew H. Anderson, Murky Waters: The Legal 
Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, 53 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 55, 58 (2006) (discussing U.S. 
mine hunting and mine-clearing by underwater MAVs). 
109. Kraska, supra note 7, at 49. The types of uses of MAVs may cross into important 
non-lethal uses in an armed conflict, including surveys of shallow waters, and mine detection 
and monitoring, as well as carrying out countermeasures against mines and jamming enemy 
communications. 
110. McLaughlin, Unmanned Naval Vehicles at Sea, supra note 2, at 114. 
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112. See Chadwick, supra note 22. 
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at a preprogrammed pressure level until at predetermined time intervals ris-
ing to the ocean surface to broadcast its position and as the case may be, 
collected data to a satellite.”113 A glider is an autonomous underwater vehicle 
with a buoyancy engine, so that it can also change its depth but maintain a 
horizontal movement.114 
Floats and gliders may be subject to the regime of marine scientific re-
search as set out in Part XIII of UNCLOS,115 but questions are prompted as 
to whether they are conducting marine scientific research or the data gath-
ered is for defense or operational purposes. The reality of this conflict was 
evident at the end of 2016 when China seized a U.S. underwater MAV 
launched from the USNS Bowditch.116 Pedrozo and Kraska have argued that 
China’s actions were unlawful on the following bases: 
 
China’s capture of the drone violates three norms embedded in interna-
tional maritime law and reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and other treaties. First, the drone is a “U.S. vessel,” and its 
seizure shows a willingness to openly steal American property operating 
legitimately at sea. Second, China’s action is all the more blatant because 
the U.S. “vessel” enjoys sovereign immune status. No foreign nation may 
purport to assert legal jurisdiction over it. Third, the capture is further evi-
dence of China’s penchant for disrupting freedom of navigation on the 
high seas, despite Beijing’s repeated assertions that it has never interfered 
with freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.117 
 
Their view is thus premised initially on the glider being considered a “vessel” 
or “ship” and, as such, the MAV in this scenario is also subject to sovereign 
                                                                                                                      
113. Bork, Karstensen, Visbeck & Zimmermann, supra note 26, at 299 (citing Intergov-
ernmental Oceanographic Commission, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
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supra note 10. 
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ture-us-underwater-drone-violates-law-sea. 
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immunity as it was government-owned and being operated for non-commer-
cial purposes. While differences of opinion may emerge on the vessel status 
of the MAV,118 what remains pertinent under either analysis is that the 
United States enjoys the freedom of navigation on the high seas and within 
EEZs, as this freedom belongs to States rather than attaching to ships.119 To 
deny this freedom to the United States through the seizure of its MAV could 
therefore be construed as a violation of international law irrespective of the 
status of the MAV as a ship or a device,120 or whether there was a crew on 
board or not. Questions may further emerge in this regard as to whether the 
MAV was being deployed consistently with requirements of navigational 
safety,121 and to what extent those rules apply to the MAV at issue.122 
A navy’s use of floats and gliders further challenges the nature of the 
research being conducted (that is, what is it doing, not just what is doing it), 
and whether it is subject to coastal State jurisdiction as a result. This debate 
has emerged even when a vessel is crewed,123 so it is not the lack of a crew 
that makes a difference to the regulatory framework. Kraska and Pedrozo 
noted that the USNS Bowditch and its drones were engaged in military activ-
ities at the time of China’s seizure of the MAV.124 As such, we must be able 
to distinguish a MAV that is a ship from a MAV that is an object/device and 
further consider the type of activities in which it is engaged to assess the 
legality of State conduct in any given situation. In distinguishing between a 
ship and a device, it might be a question that is to be determined on the basis 
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of particular facts about a MAV (for example, its size, functions, and oper-
ating capability),125 rather than formulating general principles that cannot 
necessarily predict all technological advances. 
If a MAV is a vessel or a ship and engaged in surveillance, the diverse 
passage regimes under UNCLOS are then relevant.126 An underwater MAV 
is required to surface in the territorial sea when exercising the right of inno-
cent passage.127 Ships engaged in innocent passage may not launch, land, or 
take on board any military device, which might include a MAV.128 Surveil-
lance by a MAV, whether underwater, surface, or aerial, would constitute a 
violation of the right of innocent passage under Article 19 of UNCLOS, as 
the lack of a master or commander and crew on board makes no difference 
in assessing the activities of a vessel and whether they prejudice the peace, 
good order, or security of the coastal State.129 Equally, a coastal State could 
not prevent the passage of a MAV simply based on its lack of crew on board. 
While navigational rights are greater for passage through international 
straits subject to the transit passage regime, especially for warships and other 
military vessels, the passage must still be continuous and expeditious.130 Stop-
ping to launch or recover a MAV would not on its face constitute one of the 
“normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit” of a vessel.131 How-
ever, Dalton has argued that the use of a reconnaissance craft may not be 
inconsistent with the normal mode of the launching vessel if the reconnais-
sance or surveillance is needed to ensure force protection and navigational 
safety as it traverses the international strait.132 
Some commentators have noted that research or survey activities would 
not be permitted during transit passage without the consent of the littoral 
States.133 What would matter in this regard is what is consistent with the 
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“normal mode” of the vessel, and in this regard there is scope for difference 
in how this term is interpreted. The advantage of this inclusive wording is 
that MAVs can be deemed to have their own version of normal mode either 
in their own right or as auxiliaries in the operation of a warship or other 
vessel. Nonetheless, the context of the MAV’s use will be important and it 
may be the case that the use of surveillance MAVs is construed as a threat 
of the use of force.134 If the surveillance was undertaken for a defensive pur-
pose, such as minesweeping, an argument could be made that this is con-
sistent with the right of self-defense.135 The validity of such a claim would 
again be context specific and depend at least to an extent on what events had 
preceded the minesweeping operation.136 
In the EEZ, the long-standing debate between China and the United 
States as to the legality of surveillance activities by a foreign State in the EEZ 
of a coastal State remains apposite with MAVs.137 Each State must conduct 
their activities with due regard for the other,138 and not threaten the use of 
force or use force.139 Consideration must be given as to the type of research 
undertaken and whether the research constitutes “military activities” or 
whether it might require coastal State consent if conducted in its EEZ.140 
China may ultimately decide to moderate its approaches to MAVs given that 
it is also “plac[ing] considerable emphasis on developing strategies and tech-
nologies suited to an AI-conducive battle environment.”141 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
McLaughlin has rightly noted that we should not underestimate “the power 
of general principles to offer sufficient governance during the inevitable hi-
atus that ensues whilst the impacts of a technological development are sorted 
through.”142 Kraska reinforces this view, stating, “the conclusion that the 
rules governing unmanned systems are derived from broader principles of 
international law designed for manned ships and aircraft is really the only 
realistic course.”143 The survey of international law relating to maritime se-
curity in this article has demonstrated that the existing principles can be ap-
plied to MAVs in diverse settings. Limitations in the legal framework that 
exist for crewed ships remain limitations when MAVs are involved. 
The ship/vessel debate remains pertinent in the maritime security set-
tings, raising a question of whether any floating craft should be deemed a 
ship in an approach similar to aviation. Nonetheless, the ability to interpret 
treaties pursuant to their ordinary meaning in context provides some scope 
to address situations on a case-by-case basis depending on the MAV’s oper-
ations and capability. What might seem to be limitations on MAVs (such as 
physically boarding a vessel) may ultimately become things of the past as 
technology further advances. We will need to monitor continuously how well 
the international law framework stands the test of time. 
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